Responsibility to protect
The appearance in the House of Commons library of this document [PDF] has caught the eye of David T at Harry's Place. It refers to a new doctrine (called the "Responsibility to Protect") which is supposed to create a moral and legal framework for action by the international community in the event of major humanitarian crises - in particular those involving mass violence against civilians, where these are overlooked (or perpetrated by) a state. Although world leaders signed up to this doctrine - at least in principle - in 2005, it remains somewhat controversial because of the implication that military force may be used to protect the ctiizens of a state in violation of the sovereignty of that state. It is therefore an explicit justification for humanitarian intervention. The House of Commons research paper summarises the new doctrine in this way:
The key questions are, then: will the United Nations (and in particular the veto-wielding states on the U.N. Security Council) take seriously this new concept in international relations? And what is the situation regarding unilateral action by individual states and groups of states when the United Nations fails to act?
We have been here before, haven't we? In fact, we are right there now. Both the Kosovo intervention in the late 1990s and the Iraq intervention were justified on humanitarian grounds, although the latter (and Afghanistan) also had obvious wider political objectives in terms of international security. When the most abiding characteristic of the United Nations is paralysis, the Responsibility to Protect will largely be borne by those countries who are prepared to shed their own blood for the righteous aspirations of others.
The Responsibility to Protect is a three-fold duty: to prevent, to react and to rebuild.It is not hard to imagine which countries may harbour fears about Responsibility to Protect: Sudan, Burma and Zimbabwe are no doubt three. It is also not hard to think of countries where the doctrine might be applied: Darfur (Sudan), Burma and Zimbabwe leap immediately to mind.
This three-fold duty falls by default to the state concerned but should be assumed by the international community whenever there is a “manifest failure” of the state to discharge its responsibilities to its citizens.
The most controversial element of the doctrine is the idea that the international community, authorised by the UN Security Council, could mount a military intervention in order to stop mass atrocities.
It remains unclear whether in the event of Security Council paralysis, a unilateral intervention would prove legitimate or legal.
There is considerable debate over the status and scope of the Responsibility to Protect. On balance, most observers and states believe that it remains a political commitment and has not yet acquired legal force.
Implementation of the Responsibility to Protect has proved difficult due to a range of challenges both conceptual and practical.
Many non-Western countries harbour fears about abuse of the Responsibility to Protect.
The key questions are, then: will the United Nations (and in particular the veto-wielding states on the U.N. Security Council) take seriously this new concept in international relations? And what is the situation regarding unilateral action by individual states and groups of states when the United Nations fails to act?
We have been here before, haven't we? In fact, we are right there now. Both the Kosovo intervention in the late 1990s and the Iraq intervention were justified on humanitarian grounds, although the latter (and Afghanistan) also had obvious wider political objectives in terms of international security. When the most abiding characteristic of the United Nations is paralysis, the Responsibility to Protect will largely be borne by those countries who are prepared to shed their own blood for the righteous aspirations of others.




